Introduction
Access to and management of water resources is inherently political. Drawing on fieldwork from the Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa programme, largely undertaken in Zimbabwe, with some additional material from South Africa and Mozambique, t his article examines the politics surrounding water resources and policy change in southern Africa and r eaches some t entative conclusions of relevance to understanding current policy processes in regional water sector reform.
At the r egional level, s outhern Africa has experienced r apid u pheaval and s ocio-political change in t he last 15 y ears. With t he end of apartheid in South Africa, the post-independence political developments in Zimbabwe and the postcivil war situation in Mozambique, fundamental political and economic shifts have been made at ideological, institutional and policy levels. There is a new "regionalism" in w hich w ater resources feature v ery prominently (Chenje and Johnson 1996) . This new political landscape includes new structures and forms of state-society relations of enormous relevance to and impact on access to resources by poor people. In many cases, there have also been significant shifts in economic policy with macro-scale impacts, sometimes in tandem with wider economic impacts caused by drought in the region (see articles 1 and 2 of this Bulletin; Marquette 1997; Benson and Clay 1998) .
Reflecting this political "sea change", much policy change has addressed fundamentals, in terms of ownership r ights, r estitution and t he nature of historical oppression of particular groups, and the wider issue of the political enfranchisement and empowerment of the individual as a political actor (for South Africa, see for example, Abrams 1996; Kihato and Schmitz 2002) . Central to much of this change has been a concern to address the poverty affecting much of the regional population of 200 million (Turton and Henwood 2 002); in many senses water reforms have been seen as essential to wider social and political development in countries of the region (Muller 2001) . Not surprisingly, as policies with these fundamentals embedded within them have begun to translate into action at the scale of local and national institution-building, important contestations of formal and informal political power have emerged, both in terms of how to access resources under new sets of institutional arrangements and how to begin to control the new sets of institutional arrangements for long-term social and economic gain.
Such processes are virtually inevitable in any major environment of policy change. But in s outhern Africa, they have perhaps added weight given the political histories of oppression and denial of access to natural r esources (Moyo 1991) . Part of t his linkage to local historical and political processes has been in t he "messy" nature of policy and institutional change: r eforms specific t o natural resource environments have run in parallel to wider political or "governance" reforms (or changes, at least), the pre-eminent example of which in the 1990s has been the shift to "decentralisation" of government (see article 7, this Bulletin). Put crudely, vertical s ectoral policy questions with s pecific resource orientations cut through have not yet necessarily successfully engaged w ith broader lateral changes to t he w hole s tate-society relationship. This articulation has had a number of impacts and has emerging consequences for poor people' s access to resources such as water.
The political histories attached t o particular resources have therefore been of great importance in t erms of t his articulation w ith broader governance reform. Efforts at improving access to water by the poor and marginalised, largely black, populations in southern Africa have not just been tied to global concerns about poverty reduction, but also to region-specific contexts of class, power and r ace. Few of t he current reform processes address such issues head on and instead are embedded in discourses on w ater management appropriated from global narratives and policy goals. Yet it is the "political histories" attached to reforms, perhaps invisibly so, that really count at the local level and impede or assist their progress to successful implementation, let alone impact on the poor. As this article illustrates, it is the specifics of political issues that play a key part in determining the end result at a local level of national policy reform and implementation.
The drivers of w ater policy reform t hat have emerged globally have been examined in an earlier phase of t he SLSA w ork (Nicol 2 003; see also Derman and Ferguson 2000) . Key areas of influence of these "global narratives" on water development range from the issue of resource "securitisation" under perceptions of scarcity to the bundle of ideas embedded w ithin "integrated w ater resources management" (IWRM), such as "user pays" and "stakeholder decision-making". The latter IWRM approach in particular has become a powerful narrative in t he construction of t he new water policies in southern Africa, as reflected, for instance, in t he s ubtitle of Zimbabwe' s Water Resources Management Strategy: 'Towards Integrated Water Resources Management' (Government of Zimbabwe 2001) and in Mozambique' s Water Policy, where it is stated t hat rational allocation r equires an integrated management approach. The securitisation of water (Ohlsson 1995; Tevera and Moyo 2000; Buzan et al . 1998 ) has also had a major impact on supply structure development in the region particularly in South Africa (Turton and Henwood 2002) , but also, to a lesser extent, in Zimbabwe (Zinyama 1995).
The influence of donors, acting as lightning rods for conducting global narratives into national policies, has been significant. Regional networks supported by bilateral and multilateral donors including the Global Water Partnership' s regional Technical Advisory Committee 1 have played a key role; and some bilaterals have also actively promoted t he concept of IWRM, including GTZ 2 through its piloting of an international IWRM network in southern Africa. Southern Africa w as chosen precisely because of a perceived "broad acceptance" by regional actors of the IWRM concept. Yet such concepts are created in politically benign or neutral environments and often are s upported by little knowledge of their capacity to function within more politically contentious environments. In southern Africa, though, there are no IWRM easy solutions (for a useful discussion of this in the Zimbabwean context, see Manzungu et al . 1999 ).
Drawing particularly on detailed case study work from southeastern Zimbabwe, this article identifies and examines three key areas in w ater reform processes:
1. The process of institution-building t hat accompanies policy reform and the impact of establishing new structures in contested political environments (both formal and informal), leading t o s ometimes perverse anticipated and unanticipated outcomes.
2. The different meanings attached to water by different stakeholders and the implications of these contested meanings being brought into new decision-making processes under new institutional structures.
3. The "grey area" in much policy development that allows water used productively, but at the domestic level, either to be excluded from decision-making in policy arenas; or to be misunderstood in terms of its links to poverty reduction and t he behaviour of new institutions at a local level (including, critically, the importance of livestock use and access to water as a key part of the household asset structure and as major coping mechanisms in times of drought (see Kinsey et al . 1998) ). This also brings ambiguities to difficult policy areas, such as cost recovery and t he r aising of revenues through water charging.
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The next four sections first examine in broad outline the major policy context to water reforms in southern Africa; second, they examine the three themes above in some detail with respect to the case s tudy work. Finally, t hey draw some conclusions as to possible policy development and implementation options that could address some of these critical issues.
Policy change in southern Africa

Mozambique
Mozambique' s water sector shifted from a highly centralised to a more decentralised system during the 1990s. The Water Law (1991) opened up the sector to private firms, autonomous utilities and water users associations and launched much of the subsequent institutional change. One of the more significant aspects of the Law was its distinction between "common" and private usage of water; the one s ubject to fee collection, t he other not. Water supply delivery in Mozambique has been hampered by the legacy of civil w ar and an uncoordinated approach leading to very low levels of provision into the mid-1990s. In 1997, the new Rural Water Transition Plan increased the level of technical expertise in the provinces and led to the establishment of a national community-level approach. Nevertheless, w hile t his helped t o increase the co-ordination and coherence of service delivery approaches, local capacity to undertake community-based approaches remains low and actual data on coverage and demand is often scant or unavailable. In addition, there have been wider debates about the efficacy of seeking "full cost recovery" and t he s ubcontracting provision t o private operators in peri-urban areas.
South Africa
In post-apartheid South Africa huge infrastructure development was required t o enable s ervice provision in many formerly neglected township and rural areas, but was also a major political imperative for the new government. In short, there was a forceful combination of political demand and basic need, which had to fill the vacuum between promises of black political empowerment and tangible improvements in the quality of life at a local level. The legacy of apartheid development was a skewed sector, focused on the interests of industrial, mining and white commercial farming interests; the independent "homelands" w ere largely excluded from this development process (Abrams 1996) . The r esults were a massive unserviced population which, in 1994 according to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, amounted to some 12-14 million people without formal w ater supplies and at least half t he population with no formal sanitation.
The new policy and institutional processes set in train w ith t he election of a black majority government included t he promulgation of a National Water Policy (1997), a Water Services Act (1997) and, finally, the National Water Act (1998). This process created new institutional roles and responsibilities, including new catchment management agencies (CMAs) t hat would meet demand for the resources, as well as provide the means by which to increase public participation in management. In common w ith many other countries of t he r egion t his represented an embodiment of t he concepts of IWRM w ithin complex local and national political environments. The Water Act revolutionised t he s ector, introducing the concept of a strategic reserve with which t o meet environmental s ustainability objectives and the guaranteeing of basic human needs. At a catchment level it was envisaged that management charges would cover the actual costs of management activities. However, the rolling out of this type of management structure has been slower than anticipated, largely due t o t he complexity of the task and the enormous shift represented in allocation priorities by the inclusion of new stakeholders on the CMAs.
The 1994 paper on Community Water Supply and Sanitation s ignalled an important shift from supply-side t o demand-based management, embedding principles of demand-responsive approaches and community-based management in national service delivery strategies. Build Operate Train and Transfer (BOTT) schemes were designed to s peed u p t he delivery of new services by bringing in private sector expertise. However, there were various assumptions inherent, including that communities would be able to provide for 100 per cent cost recovery and that municipal government would be able to take on the process of managing the new service structures after a given period.
This placed considerable demands on s ome municipal governments, at a time when this level of government was only in an emergent form, leading to some severe criticism and concern that they were not effective means by which to establish long-term, sustainable approaches to community supply. Until the late 1990s the BOTT schemes were regarded as the w ay forward, bringing public and private delivery t ogether with local, community-based management (Nicol 2 003). Increasingly, t he approach has been superseded by a concern to ensure a free basic w ater requirement to households. South Africa is the only country that constitutionally acknowledges the human right to water, going against current donor agendas that stress cost-recovery issues instead of rights-based ones. However, as SLSA Research Paper 17 shows, South Africa' s rights-based approaches to water are often hindered by parallel attempts to recover costs, which are in keeping w ith international donor discourses. Moreover, s everal institutional and political factors hinder the implementation of its free and basic water policy. They include problems with cross-subsidisation in rural areas, a lack of clarity of the duties and responsibilities of various implementing agencies and the poor capacity of municipal governments to implement the policy.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe' s reform process has mirrored South Africa' s, particularly the increasing emphasis on new forms of integrated water management at the catchment level. Reforms have in fact progressed further in terms of implementation, largely due to the less complex water management questions in Zimbabwe, w ith fewer competing demands for water within key basins.
The 1998 Water Act came into force in January 2000 and paved the way for a new system of decentralised w ater management institutions. It not only shifted t he institutional environment towards an IWRM model, but also fundamentally altered the basis on which water was apportioned, managed and paid for. New catchment and subcatchment councils (CCs and SCCs) became responsible for managing water resources, issuing permits and creating an effective user-management interface. The Act transformed the Water Resources Department into the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), a new parastatal funded through user fee collection through sub-catchment councils. The new government Water Strategy document stated that: 'ZINWA is to operate along commercial lines, generating its own resources for operation and maintenance of infrastructure and contracting commercial loans for capital development in its own r ight' (Government of Zimbabwe 2001).
Water supply delivery in Zimbabwe was a similarly important political issue, particularly during the post-1980 independence period. Extended basic service delivery t hrough provision of boreholes became a key government objective in the first decade post-independence. In t he 1990s, particularly as structural adjustment squeezed government budgets further, an increasing focus on cost recovery emerged u nder the influence of external agencies and in parallel t o new community-based management processes.
In common w ith both South Africa and Mozambique t hese w ater reform processes emerged as decentralisation to local government (Rural District Councils) and, ostensibly, a form of "democratic decentralisation" t ook r oot. The complex interrelationships between t hese processes are an important feature of the current policy reform process region-wide (see article 7, this Bulletin). In Zimbabwe, as in neighbouring countries, t he political landscape is, t o s ome extent, being shaped by the relationships between these r eform processes. New types of political expression are emerging and the ways in which demands for basic s ervices are articulated are increasingly a function of the relations between new sector-specific management institutions and broader governance structures at a local level.
Key thematic issues
Institutions can change: the roles people play may not
Institutional change within the reform process has been s ignificant. It has created an institutional "mêlée" that has contributed to some confusion over roles and responsibilities particularly given changes to t he t ypes of t ask u ndertaken by managers and local political actors.
Institutional complexity
Research in Chiredzi district in Zimbabwe has shown how responsibility for provision of new water supply services has been diffused between a number of s ometimes competing institutions, which include government departments and nongovernmental organisations. In some communal areas, combined with the overall shift from central government to decentralised, local-authority based provision, a s cramble for responsibilities and control by different institutional actors has resulted. One of the key reasons for this was noted by an informant who stated that:
While in the past the office of the DA [District Administrator] w as happy to control w ater provision and development in a district as drought stricken as Chiredzi, one should not fail to see the political interest in that. Through the office of the DA, central government, which is synonymous with t he r uling party, may provide water to wards and villages that voted for the ruling party. In this light, one may unwillingly hand over responsibilities for water development to the next office. The office of the DA may still w ant to maintain a coordinating role for political ends.
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In other cases, the institutional complexity relates to the "type" of water that users are accessing. The question is complicated for irrigators in lowveld Zimbabwe, depending on whether they are using river water, in which case they need to access the sub-catchment council, or water behind a dam, known as "agreement water", in which case they need t o go directly to t he newly-established ZINWA office. A lack of awareness can prompt users without the r elevant knowledge t o w aste considerable amounts of time in trying to resolve their water management issues. The chairperson of a sub-catchment council in the lowveld stated:
The truth is that people in Lower Save subcatchment do not know what is going on with regard to water reforms. First, they still consult their respective rural district councils about water issues. Secondly, they do not know the difference between ZINWA and sub-catchment councils -they think it' s one and the same thing ( SLSA Research Paper 14: 37). 5 Institutional complexity has been compounded by the broader decentralisation process. 6 Responsibility for district-level development lies with the RDCs, yet catchment and sub-catchment councils as well as the Zimbabwe National Water Authority and its local-level offices, are decentralised institutions in their own right with a broad mandate t o manage w ater in r espective catchment boundaries. Two areas of confusion arise: first, these boundaries often cut across two or three council areas making participation in the catchment councils problematic (who has the greatest stake, who can attend meetings?); second, the water management mandate of the SCCs and CCs raises important development questions, including w ho and w hat should r eceive new permits for water use?
The decentralisation process created villages, wards and rural district councils, which have become the official focal administrative points. Given t heir political role, too, they also naturally become the focus for complaints and disagreements over resource use. Confusion on "where to go" with water issues was outlined by the Chief Executive Officer of Chimanimani Rural District Council:
People are not aware of where to go with their water queries…naturally most people come to the rural district council because it is their local authority. … We constantly tell people that water issues in some parts of Chimanimanifrom the Skyline Junction, town area, Rusitu, Ndima to the surrounding areas -report to Budzi s ub-catchment council w hich is in Chipinge district. The other parts, Nyanyadzi and Cashel areas report to different subcatchment councils. You see, it' s complicated ( SLSA Research Paper 14: 39).
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This institutional division makes both reporting and participation problematic. Some areas of these catchment areas might be important hydrologically, for instance in terms of upstream catchment, but remote logistically and therefore difficult to elicit participation from.
Participation
As well as the institutional complexity and the emergence of overlapping and competing interests involved in institutional responsibility, there has also been growing complexity in the r oles and functions of participants in many of t he new institutions. The nature of participation has changed substantially and the expectations of the types of participation has brought with it competing demands and challenges. In some cases the outcomes appear to s tack t he benefits of participation against "new stakeholders" (read poor communal farmers), particularly when high transaction costs are taken into account. One local chief w ho participated in a new catchment management process in Zimbabwe outlined his experience:
At first we were not given any money for bus fare. We went to attend the meetings when we have our own business to do in town. We pushed for transport allowances, and then we were recently given Z$500. Not surprisingly, t he w hole philosophy behind participation has changed substantially. The new politics of inclusiveness, at least as stated formally, has encouraged participation at the grassroots in water management. Yet for much of the twentieth century in s outhern Africa and particularly in countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, the legal and administrative frameworks governing ownership, access, control and u se of w ater favoured elite -often racially defined -interests, notably commercial farming and mining. Communal populations in countries such as Zimbabwe were legally denied access to, and use of, water for secondary purposes, such as irrigation (e.g. through the Water Act of 1976, which tied together land and w ater rights through t he legalisation of riparian rights). In this case, the lack of understanding of the water reforms was not a trigger for resistance, rather for bewilderment about what should be done. However, in other cases significant resistance is generated. Across the region, as global narratives on water as an economic good, which came to prominence from the mid-1990s onwards, have filtered into policy-making, they increasingly come up against local narratives on the cultural and social meanings attached to water resources.
Meanings and resistance
The water reforms in Zimbabwe are a case in point, where the concept of water with costs attached to its delivery (even if it seemingly flows naturally towards the u ser) grates against ideas of community and communal r esources based on local meanings, beliefs and concerns. In Budzi subcatchment, w hich covers Chimanimani and Chipinge Districts, most inhabitants are ethnically Ndau. For the Ndau, water is a "God-given" natural resource, just as the land is in which it is found. Similarly to land, water forms a central element in Ndau worship, but is viewed as more than the physical form in which it is found. It attains a religious dimension and becomes that natural resource 'the people receive when ancestral spirits are approached to intercede for a successful rainy season' and which 'ancestral spirits make available in certain rivers and springs even in the event of the mother of all droughts'. 9 Thus the custodian of water is the chief and his people, and the ultimate owners are the ancestral spirits. The corollary is that traditional leaders and communal farmers have access to water because it belongs to them and their ancestors, w hich posits a conception of ownership often at odds with outsider views of how the resource is perceived locally (see Moriarty and Lovell 1998: 18) . Access to water is therefore gained (and governed) by acceptance as a member of t he s piritual community, and w illingness to respect the ancestral spirits of an area. Access to water through t raditional institutions and associated narratives also gives water a transcendental quality that links the livelihoods and religious aspects of communal area people ( SLSA Research Paper 14).
The meanings of t he r esource are t herefore as confused, in terms of imported notions of what water "is", as are the meanings of community as commonly received by intervening agencies (see Blench 1998) . The neat, territorial definition falls down u nder this more complex notion of belonging and membership. This has important implications for water management across the region. The politics involved in such cases are as much about definition of community as the relationships between communities themselves.
In the Sangwe communal area in Zimbabwe, the term "community" and its extension "community water point" is variously defined and interpreted, and each definition and interpretation is associated with a unique set of rules governing access to water. The traditional notion of "community" denotes a group of people who live in the same geographical area, share a common history and cultural heritage, and fall under the same chieftainship. In addition, these groups of people share common interests and control of natural resources. People in Ward 1, for example, are commonly referred to as, vanhu vekwa Gudo , meaning all the people who fall under the jurisdiction and chieftainship of Chief Gudo and to whom access to local natural resources is open. With r espect to w ater, members of t he Gudo community have u nfettered access to natural springs provided that certain customary rules are complied with -breaching these rules is believed to cause springs to dry up.
However, new approaches to w ater point management have challenged t his traditional system, not least by assuming new meanings for "community". Community in this case refers to a group of people sharing a water and sanitation facility. 10 Thus, a borehole drilled in Musindo village becomes a Musindo community borehole; and access to the water is limited to people residing in the village itself. Further, with community-based management, access may further be limited t o people w ho have contributed w ater point fees. Community-based management introduced new definitions defined by proximity to t he w ater points and ability to pay, w hile discarding traditional notions characterised by the commonalities of history, culture, t radition, chieftainship and ancestral spirits. The result has been that Gudo members may "flout" new rules governing access on the basis that they have a right to fetch water wherever it is found because "water is for everyone". Research found that the extension of t he t raditional notion of community from natural s prings to boreholes resulted in many villagers not contributing to water point fees, and fetching water at any borehole they wished ( SLSA Research Paper 15).
Changing availability of water also has the effect of shifting community "boundaries", as traditionally depicted. The community effectively becomes defined by the extent of its water point "users". When a community water point is functioning, the "catchment community" of a w ater point may expand, but if it is malfunctioning and there is a need t o contribute financially towards the maintenance and repairing of the borehole, the community contracts. The boundaries of communal responsibility and "ownership" may be inversely proportional to the availability (and cost) of water. Consequently, borehole maintenance is a major issue at the local level. Often, at a regional level, t he concept of instilling a "sense of ownership" is repeated by agencies and in particular NGOs, over and over again. This concept of ownership appears rooted in a preconceived idea of what an "owner" looks like, which is fixed across time and space. Added to this is the practical difficulty of implementation. In some parts of Sangwe, the longer-term process of building ownership and community capacity to manage even in favourable community circumstances was frequently reported t o be hurried and piecemeal. Many respondents criticised the training as a "one-off" event with no follow-up and refresher courses. In some cases, too, the trainers were more interested in future work in maintaining the pumps than in actually transferring skills to communities ( SLSA Research Paper 15) .
Similarly in South Africa, a legacy of government provision and control has rendered attempts at community-level management problematic. As Zolile Ntshona and Edward Lahiff observe in relation to Mdudwa village in the former Transkei:
The critical issue facing water schemes in the Eastern Cape is their maintenance. Many schemes have now been implemented but few are operating as intended, mainly due to poor maintenance. This, in turn, is widely attributed to the general lack of a sense of ownership among users, with the schemes being widely viewed as government property. People in Mdudwa are still waiting for "the government" to come; and make t heir scheme function properly and unless this happens it appears unlikely that the standpipes will ever operate as intended ( SLSA Research Paper 5: 27 ).
In terms of catchment level management, meanings and their attachment to resources are similarly a contested area. The process by which the new narrative on w ater as an economic good has become established within reform processes has been particularly controversial. In Zimbabwe the abruptness of "learning" about the new reforms and w ays of u nderstanding t he r esource-user relationships was occasionally vividly demonstrated: 'I came to know of Budzi SCC when I saw a young man on a motorcycle who had come with a receipt for water charges … which I knew nothing about' 11 was how one small-scale farmer explained the new situation. Another stated that: 'last year the levy was Z$200 and this year it is Z$2000. I don't know how it was raised and why? But whether I know it or I don't, I have to pay ' ( SLSA Research Paper 14: 27) . 12 Resistance to the new system was also put forward in some cases: 'Why pay for water and whose water is it anyway? … If you can show and prove to me that the water I am drinking is ZINWA water I will pay. … This is our water from time immemorial.' 13 The r oles played by "new stakeholders" in all countries, were in flux during the period of the research. In Zimbabwe, this was particularly acute, due t o t he land r esettlement process. In s ome instances the narratives of access to land, s o strongly pushed by the war veterans lobby, have been extended to water. The Chairperson of the Zimbabwe National Wealth Recovery Matsiyo Project, an association of 105 newly-resettled farmers at Wolfscrag farm, stated, for example, that: 'we do not want to steal this dam from him (a commercial farmer), but to share with him the water, just as we are sharing the farm. There is enough water in the dam for all of us'.
14 Thus, there is perhaps the beginnings of an articulated vision for water and livelihoods among new settlers, with many now recognising that gaining access to land is only one part of t he w ider struggle for livelihoods
Water is first and foremost a livelihood resource: management should reflect this fact
The two previous sections have helped to illustrate some of the complexity that new reforms in the water sector are both generating and meeting in rural areas in southern Africa, focusing specifically on Zimbabwe. However, there is a further factor in the r eform process that may prove of great significance in terms of future poverty reduction impact. This is the apparent "grey area" between what is understood in regional policy documents and institutions as a basic, domestic or "primary supply" and what is additional to this level and deemed commercial usage and which should be paid for at cost.
The s ignificance of t his "grey area" is in understanding t he r ole of w ater in household livelihoods and what impact charging for given quantities may have on t hese livelihoods. Increasingly there is a recognition that insufficient account has been made of household livelihood uses, ranging from livestock production to small household gardens and cottage industry, within water sector reform processes, specifically the lack of commitment to ensuring t hat this domestic "plus" level of w ater is available, r eliable and affordable. 15 The r esidual influence of large-scale farming is understandably evident in many of t he new "integrated w ater management institutions". Systems developed to allow bottom-up revenue collection largely depend on t hese large-scale farmers being charged for water supply in order to generate significant revenue streams at fairly low relative administrative cost. Charging many smaller farmers smaller amounts provides for a far greater institutional headache. Now that the land reform programme has brought about the comprehensive dismemberment of many large-scale commercial farms in Zimbabwe the nature of the institutionaluser interface has changed substantially in many areas. Previously in Budzi s ub-catchment, for instance, nearly all commercial farmers have (or had) water rights on rivers that flowed through their farms. Of the more than 500 water rights in Budzi s ub-catchment, more t han 90 per cent belonged t o predominantly white commercial farmers. Many commercial farmers viewed t he access and use of water by communal farmers, particularly newly-resettled farmers, as leading to 'massive land degradation, s iltation and disappearance of rivers'. To this end, the major concern of commercial farmers, Budzi and Lower Save sub-catchment councils and indeed the Save Catchment Council, was with the establishment of conservation measures in u pstream catchments ( SLSA Research Paper 14) . The establishment of effective s ervice delivery and w ater resources development that benefited emerging small-scale farmers has been largely off the agenda of many institutions.
Yet the linkage between w ater and household livelihoods is crucial in order for the new water users and participants in the institutions truly to be stakeholders in management processes. At present there is largely tokenistic and partial participation for a variety of reasons, including the opportunity and transaction costs involved in participation. It should be no surprise that the process is inherently politicised. In Sangwe communal area, for example, the provision of boreholes has been a "reward" for supporters of t he local MP and councillors.
Understanding t he limits to participation and payment are therefore crucial in assessing the likely impact of water sector reforms on rural livelihoods. There are fine thresholds in household income that determine ability or inability to contribute towards repairs and maintenance. In contexts of extreme livelihood v ulnerability, w ith increasing unemployment, intermittent and declining remittance income, and the burden of HIV/AIDS (see article 2 , t his Bulletin), t he longer-term planning and management of financing is extremely difficult, making cost-recovery a major implementation challenge.
Conclusions
The drive to reform water policy in Zimbabwe, specifically and in southern Africa, more generally, has been bound up with a variety of goals. These are based around global narratives on managing water under perceived conditions of scarcity, better ways of achieving efficient management structures and the creation of viable community management and financing mechanisms. Yet these sector-centric goals are overlain by broader political agendas arising out of complex political histories in which control, exploitation and, in many cases, subordination of large sections of the population have taken place.
Within t his environment the institutional development required to establish viable structures and decision-making processes will have to adjust to political realities at a local level, but also seek to engage with these realities through creating greater linkage to the broader governance reforms taking place. This means connecting resource governance institutions more effectively to processes of establishing and precipitating local demands for resources, through institutions of local government, including district councils and municipalities.
This kind of political connectivity is likely to strengthen the resource management process and certainly create a basis for challenging some of the more entrenched resource-based interests at the local level. In the case of water supply, as well as water resource development processes, this entails the empowering of local authorities within t he catchment management process through increasing their role and s take in t he w ater management process. One vehicle might be to seek ways of using some of the locally-generated revenues for specific resource development measures at a local level. Otherwise the process of charging for water remains an extractive one from the periphery to the centre. This could also s erve t he s econdary purpose of using broader resource management revenues to cross-subsidise w ater supply developments for more deprived areas within districts. At a more fundamental level, increasing local-level involvement in the councils could also help t o facilitate t he links between local knowledge, including t he indigenous and competing narratives of meaning on the resource and decision-making and r esource development processes at higher levels.
The second major challenge is to create the means within t hese new institutional s tructures to understand the "grey area" of water for broader livelihoods uses and, at a minimum, to bring some clarity to the issues of payments for water usage that are non-commercial, yet go beyond the basic "primary" or domestic-level usage. Bringing greater local knowledge into decision-making, as well as increasing the linkage between decision-making in new institutions and the demands placed on local political actors, can help t o encourage new stakeholders and decision-makers to make more informed choices on how to implement policy and, indeed, how to feedback to a national level the strengths or weaknesses in policy impact.
At a broader level, t hese s hifts would help t o increase t he feedback loop t o national policymakers and t o encourage more flexible and dynamic policy processes that were inherently more responsive to demand, on the one hand, and able to establish levels and types of impact on the other.
One major outstanding issue, particularly at the local level, w ill r emain t he challenges and competition over formal and informal systems of authority. Combining these systems of authority in new institutions, may precipitate greater coherence in decision-making or, at the least, in addressing local community and household-level issues to policy-makers. At present there is evidence of considerable local level politicking over resource access and management which, in the long term, may serve t o disenfranchise r ural people and hinder resource development processes.
Moreover, access to natural resources has to be a starting point for policy-makers and planners not simply in sectoral institutions but in those that serve some form of "cross-cutting" role, for instance to local district councils and municipalities. An awareness of water and livelihoods linkages can help t o establish potential s ynergies between institutions at a local level, so that the actions of local councillors in facilitating demands, of local traditional elders in articulating demands from communities, and local key stakeholders themselves in these institutions, can be framed in a language of water availability, access and usage that both accords with and responds to rural household livelihoods. The real challenge is largely a political one and encompasses the basis of the resource, the ways in which that knowledge is articulated within institutions and the ways in which the user group and s takeholder participation processes can be used t o establish more coherent approaches to common development problems at a local level.
